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Niels Provos and Thorsten Holz
Honeypot BackgroundA honeypot is as a closely monitored computing resource that we intend to be probed, attacked, or compromised. The value of a honeypot is determined by the information that we can obtain from it. Monitoring the data that enters and leaves a honeypot lets us gather information that is not available to NIDS. For example, we can log the key strokes of an interactive session even if encryption is used to protect the network traffic. To detect malicious behavior, NIDS require signatures of known attacks and often fail to detect compromises that were unknown at the time it was deployed. On the other hand, honeypots can detect vulnerabilities that are not yet understood.
Because a honeypot has no production value, any attempt to contact it is suspicious. Consequently, forensic analysis of data collected from honeypots is less likely to lead to false positives than data collected by NIDS.
Honeypots can run any operating system and any number of services. The configured services determine the vectors available to an adversary for compromising or probing the system.
High-Interaction HoneypotsA high-interaction honeypot can be compromised completely, allowing an adversary to gain full access to the system and use it to launch further network attacks.
Low-Interaction HoneypotsIn contrast, low-interaction honeypots simulate only services that cannot be exploited to get complete access to the honeypot. Low-interaction honeypots are more limited, but they are useful to gather information at a higher level, e.g., learn about network probes or worm activity. They can also be used to analyze spammers or for active countermeasures against worms.
We also differentiate between physical and virtual honeypots.
When gathering information about network attacks or probes, the number of deployed honeypots influences the amount and accuracy of the collected data. A good example is measuring the activity of HTTP based worms. We can identify these worms only after they complete a TCP handshake and send their payload. However, most of their connection requests will go unanswered because they contact randomly chosen IP addresses. A honeypot can capture the worm payload by configuring it to function as a web server. The more honeypots we deploy the more likely one of them is contacted by a worm.
Physical versus Virtual HoneypotsPhysical honeypots are often high-interaction, so allowing the system to be compromised completely, they are expensive to install and maintain. For large address spaces, it is impractical or impossible to deploy a physical honeypot for each IP address. In that case, we need to deploy virtual honeypots.
You can find more information on Honeypots in Lance Spitzner's paper.
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 by Niels Provos
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